We present evidence against the standard assumptions that social preferences are stable and can be measured in a reliable, nonintrusive manner. Researchers often measure social preferences by posing dictator type allocation decisions. The Social Value Orientation (SVO) is a particular sequence of dictator decisions. We vary the order in which the SVO and a lager stakes dictator game are presented. In our …rst study, we …nd that prosocial subjects act even more prosocially when the SVO is administered …rst, whereas sel…sh subjects are una¤ected by the order. In our second study, we vary the order of the SVO and a nonstandard dictator game. We do not …nd the e¤ect found in the …rst study. This suggests that the …rst result is driven by choices involving the size of surplus. Although we cannot determine whether the timing a¤ects preferences or the measure of preferences, our results are incompatible with the assumptions that social preferences are stable and can be measured in a reliable, nonintrusive manner.
Introduction
It is commonly assumed that subjects have stable preferences over outcomes. It is also commonly assumed that standard techniques to measure these preferences are reliable and can be performed in a nonintrusive manner. If these two assumptions hold, then the order in which we perform the measurement of preferences should not matter. However, we present evidence which challenges these assumptions.
It is signi…cant if a systematic violation of these assumptions is found. Measures of preferences are of interest primarily because they are helpful in making predictions regarding behavior. However, if the outcome of a measurement can a¤ect future outcomes, either because preferences are not stable or the measure is not reliable, then the value of the measure is diminished.
In order to substantiate the claim that the timing of the measurement can a¤ect future outcomes, one might be tempted to measure preferences and have the subjects play a strategic game (for instance, the prisoner's dilemma) but vary the order in which the items are presented to the subject. However, if the experimenter detected that the relationship between the measure and behavior in the game is a¤ected by the order in which the items are given, this di¤erence is not exclusively attributable to the timing of the measure. This is because behavior in a strategic game is not exclusively a function of preferences but also, for instance, expectations regarding the behavior of others. Therefore, rather than directing subjects to play a strategic game, we o¤er two nearly identical measures of preferences, and vary the order in which they are presented to the subjects. By doing this, we are con…dent that the e¤ects which we …nd are not due to the more complicated features involved in the play of a strategic game.
It has been known for some time that many subjects do not simply maximize their own material payo¤s. 1 Speci…cally, it is often observed that some subjects will sacri…ce their own material payo¤s so that other subjects will receive a better material outcome. Researchers often attempt to infer the nature of these social preferences by posing a series of allocation decisions, often referred to as dictator games. These decisions entail a choice of an allocation of 1 For an early example, see Deutsch (1958). hypothetical or material outcomes distributed between the subject and another subject. One measurement technique is to simply pose a dictator game to a subject. Another measurement technique, which involves a speci…c sequence of dictator games, is Social Value Orientation (SVO).
In our experiment, we vary the order of the SVO and a standard, lager stakes dictator game. 2 While we …nd that SVO outcomes are signi…cantly related to outcomes in the dictator game, we also …nd that the mapping between these outcomes are related to the order in which they are given. Speci…cally, we …nd that the subjects, for whom the SVO indicates prosocial preferences, act even more prosocially in the larger stakes dictator game when the SVO is administered …rst. By contrast, we …nd that the subjects for whom SVO indicates sel…sh preferences are una¤ected by the order.
To help identify possible causes of the above result, we run another study identical to the …rst, with the exception that the dictator game exhibits a relative price of each allocation of 1 to 3, rather than the standard 1 to 1. In other words, each $0.50 kept by the subject reduces the recipient's payo¤s by $1.50. In this case, we …nd no signi…cant di¤erence between the prosocials who complete the SVO before the dictator game and the prosocials who complete the SVO after the dictator game. This suggests that decisions involving the creation of surplus in the measurement of SVO are important to the endogeneity found in the prosocials of the …rst study.
Given the results of our experiment, we are unable to distinguish between whether the measurement a¤ects the social preferences of the subject or whether the measure a¤ects the subsequent performance of another measure. Although we cannot distinguish between these two explanations, we can conclude that, given the assumptions commonly applied to experiments, we should not observe the behavior found in this experiment. Further, as we have uncovered a systematic relationship between the treatment, the action of the subjects and the measure, we describe our results as endogenous rather than merely unstable.
The results of our experiment also suggest that the dictator game, without the creation or destruction of surplus, seems to be more reliable and less intrusive than measures which create or destroy surplus. Perhaps most importantly, our results suggest that measuring social preferences before observing behavior might induce greater heterogeneity in subsequent behavior than that which would have occurred if the measurement had not been made.
Social Value Orientation as a Measure of Social Preferences
We use SVO because it is relatively easy to administer and interpret. The speci…c technique which we use, adapted from Van Lange et. al. (1997) , consists of 9 items with three possible choices involving material payo¤s accruing to the subject and another subject. 3 Each of the nine items has an individualistic response, a prosocial response and a competitive response.
The individualistic response is the one in which the material payo¤s accruing to oneself are the largest. In other words, selecting the individualistic choice suggests that the subject neither positively nor negatively values material payo¤s accruing to the other subject. The prosocial response is the one in which the sum of the material payo¤s accruing to both the subject and the other subject is the largest. In other words, selecting the prosocial response suggests that the subject positively values the material payo¤s accruing to the other subject.
The competitive response is the one in which the di¤erence between the material payo¤s accruing to the subject and the other subject is the largest. In other words, selecting the competitive choice suggests that the subject negatively values material payo¤s accruing to the other subject.
Translated into a utility function, SVO measures the form of u(x own ; x other ) where x own is the material payo¤ accruing to self and x other is the material payo¤ accruing to another Further, there is much written on the stability of SVO. For instance , Bogaert et. al. (2008) suggest that over the 40 years since its introduction by Messick and McClintock (1968) , SVO has been widely regarded as providing a stable measure of a personality trait. However, recent work has suggested instances where SVO can be a¤ected by the setting and is thereby a less than perfectly stable measure. Iedema and Poppe (1994) show that the measurement of SVO can be a¤ected by self-presentation e¤ects. Smeesters et. al. (2003) show that priming 3 See the appendix for a complete description of the SVO items which we use. certain types of behavior can lead to a di¤erent mapping from SVO to behavior. 4 While SVO is considered relatively stable, to our knowledge there is no work suggesting that outcomes of SVO can be a¤ected by the timing of its administration.
It is obviously problematic that the timing of the measurement of preferences might a¤ect the relationship between the measure and behavior related to the measure. A measure is primarily useful to the extent that it can form a basis for making predictions about behavior. 5 When behavior and the measure of preferences are functions not exclusively of preferences then the usefulness of the measure is somewhat degraded.
SVO also appears in the economics literature. 6 However each of these papers uses the ring measure (Griesinger and Livingston, 1973) , which is slightly di¤erent than the technique which we use. The ring measure consists of 24 pair-wise items rather than 9 items with 3 responses. 7 However, similar to the technique which we employ, the ultimate objective is to classify subjects as one of a few types. Relatively little is known about the relationship between the ring measure and the measure which we employ (Bogaert et. al., 2008) . However, we opt for the latter as it requires fewer responses and, in our opinion, is more transparent.
As a result of these characteristics, we conjecture that the e¤ects which we …nd here would only be strengthened by using the ring measure.
Finally, measuring social preferences via dictator games, like SVO, has the advantage that it only considers a situation where strategic issues are absent. Although all decisions would be made in the absence of the feedback of the actions of other dictators, it still remains possible that the subject would anticipate some reciprocal arrangement. Therefore, similar to Carpenter (2005) , we employ a triadic design whereby each dictator decides an allocation involving self and another dictator. This other dictator does not decide on an allocation involving the original dictator but rather on a third dictator.
Other Measures of Social Preferences
Another commonly used social preference measurement technique was developed by Andreoni and Miller (2002) . SVO is similar to this technique in that both techniques pose a series of dictator games however there remain important di¤erences. In Andreoni and Miller, choice is much less restricted than in SVO. Each SVO item has only three possible responses, whereas in Andreoni and Miller each item seeks an allocation of tokens ranging from 40 to 100. As a result, Andreoni and Miller yields less coarse data than does SVO. However, the choice in Andreoni and Miller is less transparent than SVO, as the latter explicitly lists the material allocation of each choice. We are not aware of a study which compares the relative merits of SVO and that proposed by Andreoni and Miller. Charness and Rabin (2002) pose a series of simple games to learn the speci…c form of social preferences 8 related to relative wealth and reciprocity. The nature of the social preferences might depend on whether other's payo¤s are higher than or lower than the subject's own payo¤s, therefore Charness and Rabin vary this aspect of their items. By contrast, in SVO the subject decides among choices where monetary payo¤s accruing to self are never less than that accruing to the other subject. Also, in contrast the technique employed in Charness and Rabin, SVO is not equipped to evaluate preferences for reciprocity.
Endogenous Social Preferences and Behavioral Spillovers
Consider the relationship between our paper and research on endogenous social preferences.
For instance, Carpenter (2005) and Canegallo et. al. (2008) investigate how the strategic environment can a¤ect preferences. 9 Also, Guth et. al. (2008) …nd that subjects who contribute more in a public goods game are signi…cantly more trusting in a subsequent investment game.
By contrast, we study whether the decision in a commonly used measure of social preferences can a¤ect the outcome of a subsequent measure of social preferences. Further, as we …nd a systematic relationship, in our view the results are best described as endogenous.
There also exists a strand of literature which examines the role of the environment on play in games. For instance , Bednar et. al. (2010) describe an experiment in which subjects simultaneously play two distinct games with di¤erent opponents. The authors …nd that behavior in a particular game is a¤ected by corresponding paired game. 10 This literature contends that strategies which are used in one game are often applied to the other, despite that the games should be played independently. The authors examine these behavioral spillovers but, unlike the present paper, they do not directly measure preferences.
2 Study 1
Overview
We seek to test whether outcomes in a measure of social preferences can a¤ect subsequent measurements. Therefore, we direct subjects to complete the SVO and make an allocation in a standard dictator game, however we vary the order in which these are given to the subjects.
Procedure
A total of 96 students enrolled in economics classes at a university in the northeastern United States participated. Study 1 was conducted in 5 classes of 16, 21, 39, 12, and 8 subjects. The responses were entered on paper. The subjects were given course credit for attendance and were told that that a randomly selected 25% from each session would be paid the amount earned in the experiment. The subjects completed the SVO and decided on an allocation in a standard $10 dictator game.
The subjects were aware of the triadic design as they were told to make allocation decisions involving themselves ("You") and another subject ("Other1"). Another subject ("Other2") was to make allocations involving Other2 and You. Therefore, the amount accruing to each subject was what was kept in the You-Other1 allocation decisions plus what Other2 did not keep in the Other2-You allocation decisions. In both the SVO and dictator game, the status of You, Other1 and Other2 remained …xed. This description of the triadic design was provided 1 0 Also see Bednar and Page (2007) , Crawford and Broseta (1998) and Van Hyuck et. al. (1993). verbally by the same male experimenter and in written form given to each subject. The exact form of the written instructions are provided in the appendix.
The SVO entailed the exact nine items from Van Lange et. al. (1997) . The subjects were presented with three items on each of three pages. In Van Lange et. al., the subjects decide on an allocation of points which carry no …nancial implications. By contrast, in our experiment subjects are o¤ered a conversion rate of points to money, whereby the subject is e¤ectively deciding on an allocation of a small amount of money. Across all 9 SVO items, the subject could keep as little as $0.94 and as much as $1.06. Also across the SVO items, the subject could send as little as $0.19 and send as much as $0.94. The subjects were not told these amounts, however they could be easily calculated. The exact items and the conversion from points to money in the SVO are given in the appendix. The dictator game was presented to the subjects in $0.25 increments. The subjects were directed to indicate which of the 41 dictator game allocations they most preferred. The exact form of the dictator game is provided in the appendix in order to illustrate that it is unlikely that there was any confusion about the allocation in the dictator game.
Within each of the 5 classes, approximately half of the subjects answered the SVO items then made a choice in the dictator game. We refer to this treatment as SVO First. Approximately half of each class responded to the dictator game then answered the SVO items. We refer to this treatment as SVO Last. Note that there is no feedback in this experiment. Each subject completes the experiment without knowing what the other subjects have selected.
Results
In this study, the amount kept by the subjects, which is the sum of the amount kept in the SVO and the amount kept in the dictator game, ranged from $0.94 to $11.06, with an average of $7.09. The total amount accruing to the subjects, which is the sum of what was kept by the subject and what was sent by Other2, ranged from $2.51 to $21.93, with an average of $11.69.
Using the procedure of Van Lange et. al. (1997) , we categorized 32 subjects (33%) as prosocials, 39 subjects (41%) as individualists and 5 subjects (5%) as competitors. There were 20 subjects (21%) who we could not classify as they did not select a minimum of 6 choices of a particular type. As one would expect, there is a signi…cant relationship between choice in the SVO and choice in the dictator game. The prosocial subjects (M = 4:68; SD = 1:60) kept signi…cantly less than did the proself (individualists and competitors) subjects (M = 7:28; SD = 2:48), 1 1 See Bohnet and Frey (1999) and Cox and Sadiraj (2011) for other papers with dictator game choices in which some subjects kept less than 50%. t(74) = 5:19; p < 0:01. 12 While unclassi…ed subjects (M = 5:75; SD = 3:19) kept less than proself subjects, t(62) = 2:09; p = 0:020 and prosocial subjects kept less than unclassi…ed subjects, t(50) = 1:61; p = 0:057.
An SVO measure equaling 9 indicates perfect consistency in the set of responses and a measure of 6, 7, or 8 indicates a less than perfectly consistent set of responses. See Table 2 Among those classi…ed as prosocial, those with a measure equal to 9 (24 subjects) kept a signi…cantly smaller share than those with a measure of 6, 7, or 8, t(30) = 2:41; p = 0:01. Also, among those classi…ed as individualistic, those with a measure equal to 9 (26 subjects) kept a signi…cantly larger share than those with a measure of 6, 7, or 8, t(37) = 2:55; p < 0:001.
Therefore, we are reasonably con…dent of the relationship between choice in the SVO and choice in the dictator game.
We now compare dictator allocations given the treatment. Study 2 follows the same procedure as Study 1 with the exception that, rather than using a standard dictator game, we use a dictator game in which the relative allocation price is 1 to 3. In other words, the most sel…sh allocation is $10 to self and $0 to other and the most generous allocation is $0 to self and $30 to other. This nonstandard dictator game has the advantages that the amount of total surplus is a matter of choice and being sel…sh is relatively more costly. If we …nd that the timing has a reduced in ‡uence on the prosocials then we favor the former explanation. If we …nd that individualists are now a¤ected by the timing then we will favor the latter explanation.
Procedure
A total of 90 students in economics classes at a university in the northeastern United States participated. Study 2 was conducted in 4 classes of 21, 42, 16 and 11 subjects. The procedures in Study 2 are identical to that in Study 1 with the exception of the form of the dictator game.
Rather than the standard dictator game in which the trade-o¤ between own payo¤s and other payo¤s is 1 to 1, the dictator game used in Study 2 has a trade-o¤ of 1 to 3. In other words, to increase the amount kept by $0.50, the subjects must reduce the amount sent to the other subject by $1.50. The subject's own payo¤s were listed in $0.50 increments and the other subject's payo¤s were listed in $1.50 increments. The subjects were directed to indicate which of the 21 dictator game allocations they most preferred. The exact form of the dictator game is provided in the appendix.
Results
In this study, the amount kept by the subjects ranged from $0.94 to $11.06, with an average of $8.17. The total amount accruing to the subjects ranged from $1.13 to $42.00, with an average of $17.36.
Again using the procedure of Van Lange et. al. (1997) , we categorized 44 subjects (49%) as prosocials, 34 subjects (38%) as individualists and 4 subjects (4%) as competitors. There were 8 subjects (9%) who we could not classify as they did not select a minimum of 6 choices of a particular type. Among those classi…ed as prosocial, subjects with a measure equal to 9 (30 subjects) kept a signi…cantly smaller share than subjects with a measure of 6, 7, or 8, t(42) = 1:70; p = 0:049.
However, in contrast to Study 1, among those classi…ed as individualistic, subjects with a measure equal to 9 (17 subjects) did not keep a signi…cantly di¤erent amount than subjects with a measure of 6, 7, or 8, t(32) = 0:52; p = 0:30.
Finally, we may ask whether the timing matters for dictator game in Study 2. See Table   6 for the amount kept in the dictator game by SVO classi…cation and treatment.
Prosocial Individualistic SVO 
Discussion
In Study 1 we found that prosocial subjects in the SVO First treatment keep signi…cantly less in the standard dictator game than prosocials in the SVO Last treatment. In Study 2 we found that there is no signi…cant di¤erence between the SVO First and SVO Last treatments for either prosocials or individualists. From this we infer that the results in Study 1 are driven by the presence of choices involving the creation of surplus, as the choice of the size of surplus is present in both stages of Study 2 but only one stage in Study 1.
In this paper, we describe two studies in which we measure social preferences through choice in the Social Value Orientation (SVO) and choice in a dictator game. In Study 1, we vary the order of the SVO and a standard dictator game. We …nd evidence that subjects with prosocial preferences act more generously in the dictator game when the SVO items are given …rst. On the other hand, our evidence suggests that subjects with individualistic preferences are not a¤ected by the order of the items. This result calls into question the assumption that social preferences are stable and that they can be measured in a reliable and nonintrusive manner.
To gain insights on the explanation for the main result in Study 1, Study 2 performs the identical procedure of Study 1 with the exception that a nonstandard dictator game is used. This nonstandard dictator game exhibits a 1 to 3 trade-o¤ between own payo¤s and other payo¤s, whereas the standard dictator game has a 1 to 1 trade-o¤. We …nd no signi…cant di¤erence between those making dictator game decisions before SVO and those making dictator game decisions after SVO, for prosocials or individualists. Study 2 suggests that the main result of Study 1 is driven by the presence of decisions regarding the size of the surplus. This creation of surplus, which seems to only in ‡uence the prosocials, is absent in the standard dictator game.
It is worth re ‡ecting on the limitations of the present experimental design. For instance, we cannot determine whether the SVO measurement a¤ects the dictator game choices, the dictator game choices a¤ects the SVO measurement or perhaps both. Such questions of endogeneity are notoriously tricky and would require further study. It is also unclear if the timing matters in the measurement of preferences via Andreoni-Miller, Charness-Rabin, or Chen-Li techniques. Also, we are unable to determine whether the relationship between behavior and the measure of social preferences is fundamentally less malleable than the relationship for prosocials or whether this is a result of the experimental design. For instance, the optimal choice of many individualists involves a corner solution at the most sel…sh allocation. In this case, it is possible that we would be unable to detect the in ‡uence of the timing of the measurement for these sel…sh subjects, whereas if their choice was interior their relationship would be found to be as the prosocials. Finally, SVO only measures social preferences when the subject receives a larger share than the other subject. The signi…cance of this detail is not clear. Hopefully, future work will shed light on these issues.
What are we to make of the results? Our results suggest that use of a measure which does not create or destroy surplus, might measure preferences in a less intrusive manner than would a measure involving surplus. Also, our results suggest that measuring social preferences before observing behavior might induce greater heterogeneity in behavior than we would observe had the measure not been given.
We asked the following 9 items (from Van Lange et. al., 1997) in order to measure the SVO of the subjects. Each of the 9 items has a competitive answer, a individualistic answer and a competitive answer. Each item is stated in terms of points where 100 points corresponded to $0.02103. The individualistic answers are: 1B, 2A, 3C, 4B, 5A, 6C, 7B, 8A and 9C. The prosocial answers are: 1C, 2B, 3A, 4C, 5B, 6A, 7A, 8C and 9B. The competitive answers are: 1A, 2C, 3B, 4A, 5C, 6B, 7C, 8B and 9A. Van Lange et. al. classi…es a subject according to the above labels if six or more items are answered according to the above.
